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STICKS AND STONES AND CHIPS OF BONES:
SHOCK HUMOR AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
IN ROACH AND DRISCOL V. STERN, INFINITY
BROADCASTING, INC., AND HA YDEN 1
INTRODUCTION

As restrictions on the media decrease and the communications
industry continues to employ sensationalist tactics to maintain
ratings, both controversy and litigation abound over when the
media should be held accountable for damages.'
Indeed, a
concerted effort is being forged to hold the media liable for
harmful consequences perceived as arising from its actions.' For
example, the Fourth Circuit recently held the publisher of an
instruction manual on contract killing liable for aiding and abetting
the murder of three individuals,4 and a Louisiana court recently
held a movie production company liable for a shooting because it
failed to discourage imitation of violent behavior portrayed on
film.5
When physical harm does not result and actions such as libel or
slander do not apply, plaintiffs traditionally have faced an uphill
climb in obtaining damages, and attorneys have resorted to more

1. Roach v. Stem, 675 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
2. Lori Tripoli, From Libel to Outrage .. .Plaintiffs' Lawyers form New
Group and Throw the Book at Media Excesses, 12 No. 8 INSIDE LITIGATION,
August 1998, at 11.
3. See, e.g., Tripoli supra note 2, at 11 ("Plaintiffs' attorneys are trying to
start a Tabloid Outrage Litigation Group to discuss better, or at least more
aggressive, methods to hold the media accountable.").
4. See Rice v. Paladin Enter., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 252 (4th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998)(holding that the book Hit Man: A Technical
Manual for Independent Contractors was so effectively written that "its
protagonist seems actually to be present at the planning, commission, and coverup of the murders the book inspires," and therefore encouraged murder).
5. See Byers v. Edmonson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998), cert.
denied by, Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P., v. Byers, 526 U.S. 1005
(1999)(holding that the motion picture Natural Born Killers fell within the
ambit of incitement of imminent lawless activity).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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innovative means to do so.6 One type of action on the rise is the
tort of outrage,7 or intentional or reckless infliction of emotional
distress, which recent decisions are reshaping to fit tort liability
claims against media defendants. The current climate has created
conflict between redress for injury and free expression, and Roach
v. Stern8 illustrates the perplexing and plainly odd new issues such
cases present.
In Roach, the New York Supreme Court, 9 Appellate Division,
held that the touching of cremated remains in a less than reverent
context over a radio and cable television broadcast did not amount
to interfering with the disposition of a corpse, and did not amount
to mishandling or desecrating the dead. Nonetheless, the court
held that the siblings of the deceased might have a valid claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress because touching
cremated remains and making crude comments about the deceased
in the context of an irreverent memorial broadcast may constitute
outrageous conduct."l This note will discuss the facts of the case,
the element of "outrageousness" in intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims and First Amendment protection in cases
against media defendants, present the arguments of the parties,
review the court's analysis, and comment on Roach s impact on
emotional distress torts involving media defendants."

6. Tripoli, supra note 2, at 11.
7. See, e.g., Tripoli supra note 2, at 11, Susan Kirkpatrick, Falwell v. Flynt:
IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress as a Threat to FreeSpeech, 81 Nw.
U. L. REV. 993, 994 (Summer 1987).
8. 675 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
9. In New York, both the trial court and the appellate court are called "The
Supreme Court." For clarity, this note will refer to the New York Supreme
Court as "the trial court," and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, as "the appellate court."
10. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 133. The court reversed the trial court's
dismissal, reinstating the complaint and remanding the case for jury trial.
11.
This note focuses on the "outrageousness" element, rather than
negligently mishandling human remains because both courts agreed that
plaintiffs failed to state a claim for interfering with and mishandling cremated
remains.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7
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I.BACKGROUND

The controversy originated in a radio broadcast of the syndicated
Howard Stem Show. 2 Deborah Roach, known as Debbie Tay,
frequently appeared as a guest on Stem's show.' 3 Dubbed the
"Space Lesbian" by Stem, Tay staked her claim to fame by
relaying to him and his listeners her bizarre tales of her alleged
sexual encounters with female aliens.14 Tay, who also worked as a
topless dancer, appeared on Stem's show with her mother, who
described her as "a lot of fun."15 Tay's appearances on Stem's
show eventually led to her own cable access program. 6
In April 1995, Tay died of a heroin overdose. 7 Tay's sister, coplaintiff Melissa Roach Driscol, had Tay's body cremated and gave
a portion of the remains to co-defendant Chaunce Hayden, Tay's
friend. 8 In July 1995, Hayden contacted Stem and discussed onair Tay's death and the disposition of her remains, and Stem
invited Hayden to appear on the show with the remains. 9 After
hearing of the conversation, Tay's brother, co-plaintiff Jeff Roach,
called the show's producer and the station manager and objected to
Stem's invitation to Hayden, and demanded that Stem refrain from
any further on-air discussion of Tay's death.20
On July 18, 1995, Hayden appeared on Stem's show, which was
also videotaped, with a box containing Tay's cremated remains.2 '
Tay's remains had not been pulverized, so the ashes contained

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
Id.at 134.
Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (Krausman, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.

17. Bill Alden, Stern Must Face $8 Million Claim, N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1998, at

1, col. 3.
18. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
19. Id.at 134.
20. Id.
21. Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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bone fragments, some with bloodstains.22 The box was shaken,
rattled, and opened, and Hayden, Stem, co-host Robin Quivers,
and others made lighthearted, off-color observations and comments
concerning the remains." Hayden compared the bone fragments to
clam shells, while Stem, wearing rubber gloves, held them up and
deliberated over whether they were parts of Tay's skull, ribs, or
teeth.24 Stem encouraged Hayden to chew on one fragment, while
someone in the background suggested that it might taste like
Cracker Jacks" and that a prize might be at the bottom of the
container.2 6 Stem offered Hayden a plastic bag in which to place
' They
Tay's remains and carry them around like "a big necklace."27
discussed putting the fragments together with Krazy Glue, and
Stem attempted to assemble various pieces while a stagehand held
up a photo of Tay.28 At one point, Stem exclaimed, "Wow, she
[Tay] was a piece of ash. 2 9
Despite the flippant manner in which Tay's remains were
handled, Stem recommended that Hayden have them properly
buried and told him to "remember her in your mind,"3 not as
bones.3 Additionally, during the broadcast, Hayden and another
guest nained Ralph engaged in a debate over whether Hayden had
sufficiently intervened and taken adequate action to prevent Tay's

22. Lori Tripoli, Second Billing,FirstRate.. .How Cub Lawyer Ralph Young
Stole the Show from "The King of All Media" 12 No. 9 INSIDE LITIGATION,
September 1998, at 9.
23. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 134-5.
24. Id. at 134.
25. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
26. Record on Appeal at 43, Roach v. Stem, 675 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. App.

Div. 1998)(No. 97-01389).
27. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 134. The record includes a transcript of the
broadcast, in which Hayden expressed his desire to carry a portion of Tay's
ashes in a sack around his neck because he felt it was a "spiritual" gesture.
Record on Appeal at 36, Roach v. Stem, 675 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998)(No. 97-01389).

28. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 134-5.

29. Id. at 135.
30. Id. at 137 (Krausman, J., dissenting).

31. Record on Appeal at 66, Roach v. Stem, 675 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998)(No. 97-01389).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7
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death.32 The closing credits for the show, which apparently was a
memorial tribute, announced that the show was "dedicated in
loving memory of Debbie Tay."33 The videotaped version of the
show subsequently aired over cable television on the E!
Entertainment Network.34
II. PROCEDURAL FACTS

On April 4, 1996, the plaintiffs, Roach and Driscol, filed a
complaint against defendants Stem, station-owner Infinity
Broadcasting, Inc., and Hayden, alleging intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress. 3
The trial court granted
defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a claim.36 Plaintiffs appealed, and the appellate court heard oral
arguments on January 9, 1998.3' The appellate court reversed the
prior decision and reinstated the complaint, holding that a jury
could find that Stem's and Hayden's conduct went beyond decency
and rose to the requisite level of outrageousness to substantiate a
claim of emotional distress.3" The matter is currently before the
Supreme Court of New York, Kings County, on remand.

32. Id. at 49-53.
33. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
34. Record on Appeal at 21, Roach (No. 97-01389).
35. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
36. Id.
37. Decision and Order at 1, Roach v. Stem, 675 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998)(No. 97-01389).
Roach,
675 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
Published by38.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. IntentionalInfliction of EmotionalDistress
1. The Restatement
The Second Restatement of Torts prescribes liability for
emotional distress to "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
'
to another[.]" 39
To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must
prove four elements: (1) that defendant's conduct was intentional
or reckless; (2) that defendant's conduct was sufficiently extreme
and outrageous, or defendant should have known was sufficiently
extreme or outrageous, to cause emotional distress; (3) that
plaintiff actually suffered severe emotional distress; and (4) that
plaintiffs emotional distress was a proximate result of defendant's
outrageous conduct. 4' A plaintiff need not suffer physical injury;
nor must he show a loss to his reputation or to his finances, as is
necessary in both defamation and invasion of privacy actions.4 ,
Additionally, one may be liable for inflicting emotional distress on
an immediate family member who is present at the time of the
outrageous conduct.42
This provision of the Restatement is
traditionally known as the "zone of danger" provision. Many
jurisdictions, including New York, have allowed recovery for
emotional distress resulting from intentional or reckless
mishandling of a relative's corpse, and theses cases have arisen in

39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1)(1965).

40. Catherine L. Amspacher and Randel Steven Springer, Humor,
Defamation, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: the Potential
Predicamentfor Private FigurePlaintiffs, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 701 at 709
(Spring 1990).
41. Tripoli, supra note 2, at 12. This note will not address libel or invasion
of privacy torts because neither was at issue in Roach.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2)(a)(1965).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7
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the context of interference with the final disposition of the
remains.43
2. The element of "outrageousness"
Although intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that
four elements be satisfied, the outrageousness of the conduct is
key. Indeed, once a plaintiff has shown that defendant's conduct
was extreme or outrageous, he has essentially proven the tort.44 A
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not
require any specific conduct, but rather bases liability on later
assessments of behavior. 45 As the New York appellate court
eloquently stated, "the tort is as limitless as the human capacity for
cruelty. 4 6 Thus, the culpability of the defendant is determinative
of "outrageousness." '
The standard is objective, requiring that conduct be so
outrageous that it goes "beyond all possible bounds of decency"
and is "utterly intolerable in a civilized community. '48 The
standard is also rigid: "[T]he law intervenes only where the distress
inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man can be expected to
endure it."49 Courts traditionally have been conservative in
recognizing damages for emotional distress because of the
difficulty in proving emotional distress, the potential for fraudulent

43. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Schmidt, 267 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1966)(awarding
damages for distress where deceased's brother refused to deliver cremated
remains to deceased's wife), Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the
Sacred Hearts of Jesus and Mary, 262 N.Y. 320 (1933)(awarding damages for
mental suffering and anguish to a plaintiff whose wife's body was relocated to
another grave site without notice).
44. Jason M. Booth, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell: Intentional Infliction of
EmotionalDistress and the FirstAmendment - A Razor-Sharp Bowling Ball, 18
Sw. L. Rev. 441, 447 (1989).
45. Howell v. New York Post, 81 N.Y.2d 115, 122 (1993).
46. Id. at 122.
47. Amspacher and Springer, supra note 40, at 713.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, COMMENT D (1965).
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)2016
OF TORTS § 46, COMMENT J (1965).
Published by49.
Digital
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claims, the possibility of imposing unlimited damages, and the
concern over opening the proverbial floodgates of litigation.5"
3. New York Law
New York has adopted the Restatement and recognizes tort
actions for both intentional and reckless infliction of emotional
distress.5" New York, though far from liberal in granting emotional
distress claims, has clarified and refined what constitutes a valid
emotional distress claim against a media defendant in recent years,
as the following cases demonstrate.
52
a. Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc.

In Howell, a New York Post photographer trespassed onto the
grounds of a private mental hospital and took pictures of Hedda
Nussbaum, adoptive mother of a child whose death from abuse a
year prior stirred public interest.5 3 A photo of Nussbaum with the
plaintiff, whose face was clearly discernable, was published in an
article about Nussbaum.54 Plaintiff sued for, among other causes,
intentional infliction of emotional distress.5 The court denied the
claim, holding that in publishing a newsworthy photo without
further action toward the plaintiff, the defendant did no more than
exercise a legal right in a permissible way, and therefore the
defendants' conduct could not properly be deemed so "outrageous"
56
that it went beyond decency.

50. Randy J. Cox and Cynthia H. Shott, Boldly into the Fog: Limiting Rights
of Recovery for Infliction of Emotional Distress, 53 Mont. L. Rev. 197 at 198
(Summer 1992).
51. See Dana v. Oak Park Marina, Inc., 660 N.Y.S.2d 906 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997).
52. 81 N.Y.2d 115 (1993).
53. Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 118.
54. Id. at 119.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 125-6.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7
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b. Esposito-Hilderv. SFXBroadcasting,Inc.s7

In Esposito-Hilder, the plaintiff sued a radio station for an
independent claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
over a broadcast.5 8 A bridal photograph of the plaintiff, an
employee of a competing radio station, was published in a local
newspaper.5 9 Defendant radio station broadcast a regular program
that featured a routine called the "Ugliest Bride Contest," in which
the hosts made derogatory comments about the brides published in
the paper.6
In selecting the plaintiffs photograph, the hosts
deviated from the normal routine and revealed her name, place of
employment, and position, and identified her supervisors. 6'
Defendants moved for dismissal for plaintiffs failure to state a
claim, contending that the plaintiff should have pled defamation,
and even then her case failed because the statements in the
broadcast constituted expression of opinion."
Although the court agreed that a defamation claim would fail,
the court nonetheless held that the plaintiff stated a prima facie
case of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 6' The court held
that the plaintiffs status as a private individual and not a public
figure entitled her to a higher standard of protection. 4 Further, the
nature of the defendants' broadcast involved a matter serving no
public interest and sought to inflict harm specifically because the
plaintiff was an employee of a competing radio station, which was
evident in its expansion of its "contest" routine to disclose the
identity of the "winner."65 In short, the defendants targeted the
plaintiff because she worked for a competing radio station, and
used their access to the media to hurt her; thus, their conduct rose
to a level of outrageousness utterly intolerable in civilized society.
57. 665 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
58. Id. at 699.
59. Id.
60. Esposito-Hilder,665 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 699-701.
64. Id. at 700.
Id. Commons@DePaul, 2016
Published by65.
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The court additionally held that broadcasting, although protected
by the First Amendment, enjoys the most limited protection
because of its easy accessibility,66 and defendants' conduct was not
comedic7 expression but rather an attempt to injure disguised as
6
humor.
B. FirstAmendment Protection
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[a]t the heart of the
First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance
of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest
and concern,"68 and that "speech on public issues occupies ' the
69
'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values."'
Thus, the purpose of the First Amendment is to safeguard the
discussion of public issues. 7' As such, courts are hesitant to
impose liability on media defendants where issues of free
expression are concerned. Indeed, as one commentator has noted,
past Supreme Court decisions clearly demonstrate that the
individual interest in peace of mind is not as weighty as society's
interest in discussing public issues. 71 In deciding tort cases against
media defendants, courts balance the plaintiffs right to redress for
harm against the media the defendant's right to free expression and
information dissemination, and the "chilling effect" that damage
awards might impose on such expression.72 In virtually all claims
66. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978)(holding
that broadcasting receives more limited First Amendment protection than other
modes of communication because material aired over radio and television
reaches the listener in the privacy of his home, and because broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children).
67. Esposito-Hilder,665 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
68. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
69. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759
(1985)(quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, Inc., 458 U.S. 886, 913
(1982)).
70. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV.
297, 333 (Jan-Feb 1995).
71. Kirkpatrick, supranote 7, at 1021.
72. Amspacher and Springer, supra note 40, at 725.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7
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against them, media defendants resort to the First Amendment for
protection of their actions,73 and they usually win because of the
level of protection afforded to free expression by the press.74
Protection of speech rests on a number of factors, and the
newsworthiness and the level of value accorded the type of
expression are of particular significance in weighing the degree of
First Amendment protection.
1.

Newsworthiness

The doctrine of "newsworthiness" developed from the tort of
public disclosure of private facts; but the newsworthiness of
allegedly offensive speech similarly has become a factor in the
context of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against
media defendants.7' Which matters constitute "public interest and
concern," and therefore warrant First Amendment protection, never
has been clearly delineated,76 and courts have shied away from
defining "news."77 However, courts clearly have demonstrated that
items deemed "newsworthy" are afforded high First Amendment

73. Id. at 702.
74. Julia A. Loquai, Keeping Tabs on the Press: Individual Rights v.
Freedom of the Press under the First Amendment, 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 447,
448 (Winter 1993).
75. See, e.g., Andrews v. Stallings, 892 P.2d 611, 625 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)
("As a general proposition, accurate publishing of newsworthy events does not
give rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress")(citing McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 905
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991)), Esposito-Hilder,665 N.Y.S.2d at 700 (finding that "the
nature of the communications made by defendants involved a matter of virtually
no public interest" and thus weighed in plaintiff's favor in a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
76. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 17 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 292 (1999)(noting that
courts defer to the press the task of defining "news").
77. Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71
WASH. L. REV. 683, 700 (July 1996)(citing Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251
F.2d
447 (3d
Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
Published by
Digital
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protection, thus making defenses on grounds of newsworthiness
almost impossible to defeat.78
Though no court has gone so far as to fix the precise limits of
"newsworthiness," courts have interpreted the doctrine to include
commentary on both public figures and on items of legitimate
public interest.79 Newsworthiness embodies speech pertaining to
political matters as well as "low gossip mongering aimed at only
the public's morbid curiosity."8 A Georgia court, for example,
recently held that the proceedings of a lawsuit against a newspaper
over an advertisement featuring a photo of the plaintiffs pierced
breast was a matter of public interest appropriate for publication.8'
The California Supreme Court recently held that an automobile
accident and rescue of one of the survivors, who was left a
paraplegic from the crash, was newsworthy. The court found a
legitimate public interest in the incident because (1) travel by car is
commonplace, (2) an emergency rescue is a vital service that many
members of the public may one day require, (3) the incident
depicted the daily challenges that emergency workers face in
handling serious accidents, and (4) the plaintiff s statement "I want
to die" and her conversation with the rescue crew added a
"dramatic and interesting" dimension to the story.83 Because it
found a legitimate public interest, the court found the incident
newsworthy.8 4 As for the broadcast, the court found no "morbid or
sensationalist prying [into private facts] for its own sake," no "lurid
and sensational tone," nor any "intensely personal" content.8" Even
a New York court recently determined the parameters of
newsworthiness.

78. See Loquai, supra note 74, at 448.
79. Scott, supra note 77, at 699-700.
80. Kirkpatrick, supra note 7, at 1020 (citing the Restatement's definition of
"authorized publicity" as items of popular appeal, including reports of crimes,
suicides, marriages, divorces, and drug overdoses, among other items).
81. Munoz v. American Lawyer Media, L.P., 512 S.E.2d. 347 (Ga. Ct. App.
1999).
82. Schulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 486-87 (Cal. 1998).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7
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In Messenger v. Gruner,6 the defendant, publisher of YM
magazine, used a photograph of an underage model to illustrate a
letter submitted to an advice column."
The letter, signed
"Mortified," was from a young girl who got drunk and had sex
with three boys at a party." The court denied, among other claims,
the plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress." The court found that although plaintiff neither authored
the letter nor authorized her photo for use in a sexual context,
defendant's use of the photo related to teen sex, teen pregnancy,
and alcohol abuse, all of which the court found to be matters of
public concern.9" Thus, even if fictionalized, the defendant's use of
the plaintiffs photo was done so in a newsworthy context, and
precluded the plaintiff's claims.9"
The court noted that
newsworthiness includes "not only descriptions of actual events,
but also articles on political happenings, social trends, and things
not considered 'hard news."'9 2 As the cases clearly demonstrate,
the threshold for newsworthiness is not particularly high, and
practically any event can be deemed newsworthy as long as it
garners some amount of public interest.9" As long as an event is
newsworthy, media speech related to it is protected.
2. Level of Value
First Amendment protection is strong, but it is not absolute.9 4
Indeed, certain types of speech are afforded higher or lower
degrees of protection than others because of their so-called "social

86. 2000 NY Lexis 75 (Feb. 17, 2000).
87. Messenger, 2000 NY Lexis 75 at 4-5.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 6.
90. Id. at 6-7.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Calvert, supranote 76, at 293-94.
94. See, e.g., Peter Gielniak, Tipping the Scales: Courts Struggle to Strike a
Balance between the Public Disclosure of Private Facts Tort and the First
39 SANTA CLARA L.2016
REv. 1217, 1249 (1999).
PublishedAmendment,
by Digital Commons@DePaul,
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Generally, the "high-low" value determination
value."'95
categorizes speech according to how much it furthers the
"historical, political, and philosophical purposes that underlie the
First Amendment. 9 6 In other words, speech that promotes the
transmission of ideas and the dissemination of truth is far more
important than speech that does not.97 Speech that causes serious
harm98 or that is "of de minimus value to society"99 is usually
afforded lower protection than speech that contains political
commentary or cultural value.' Examples of low value speech are
"hate speech" in a leaflet that proclaims, "If... the need to prevent
the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not
unite us, then the aggressions, ... rapes, robberies, knives, guns,
and marijuana of the negro surely will,''. and "commercial
speech" in the form of an unsolicited communication from an
attorney concerning a possible personal injury action.10 2
In determining the weight of a particular speech, courts assume
that the First Amendment protects all expression, and only after
they find that a particular category of speech fails to further the
principles of the First Amendment do they deem it to be of lower
value, and therefore less protected.0 3 Generally, this includes
words that incite lawless action ("fighting words"), obscenity,
child pornography, profanity, libel, and commercial speech, all of

95. Shaman, supra note 70, at 298-99.
96. R. George Wright, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell and the Role of the First
Amendment, 19 CUMB. L. REv. 19, 30-31 (1988/1989).
97. Christopher M. Schultz, Content-BasedRestrictions on FreeExpression:
Reevaluating the High Versus Low Value Speech Distinction, 41 ARIZ. L. REv.
573 (Summer 1999).
98. Shaman, supra note 70 at 298-99.
99. Id. at 300.
100. Schultz, supra note 97.
101. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252 (1952)(holding that the state
had a compelling interest in curbing defamation of racial and religious groups).
102. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (1995)(affirming the
Florida Bar Association's rule banning attorney solicitations to those who had
been in an accident until after thirty days).
103. Schultz, supra note 97. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942)).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7
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which are accorded lower First Amendment protection because of
their low or lack of social value.'
Where humor is involved, courts have consistently allowed
media defendants considerable latitude despite the content of the
speech." 5 Perhaps this is because of the history of satire and
parody in commentary on American politics. 6
However,
protection for humorous speech clearly extends beyond political
satire and commentary, and includes non-political speech that is
"so extremely nonsensical and silly that [no one] could take [it]
seriously,"'0 7 and exists solely to entertain.
3. HustlerMagazine v. Falwell' 8 and "actual malice"
Hustler is the seminal intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim against a media defendant. In Hustler, the plaintiff Jerry
Falwell, a "televangelist," sued the publisher of Hustler Magazine
for, among other causes, intentional infliction of emotional distress
due to an ad parody insinuating that his first sexual encounter was
a drunken romp with his mother in an outhouse. 9 Despite the fact
that the parody contained disclaimers," 0 the plaintiff nonetheless
contended that the defendant was liable for his emotional

104. Shaman, supra note 70, at 298-319.
105. Amspacher and Springer, supra note 40, at 702 (specifically, satire,
parody, and other forms of humor).
106.
See Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-55
(1988)(noting that without satirical political cartoons, "our political discourse
would have been poorer without them").
107. Frank v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 506 N.Y.S.2d 869, 875 (N.Y.
App. Ct. 1986)(holding that a Saturday Night Live skit poking fun at a New
York accountant was comic entertainment without malicious personal attack,
and therefore did not constitute defamation).
108. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
109. Id. at 48-49. The ad parody was modeled after advertisements for
Campari Liquor, which featured celebrities discussing their "first time" drinking
Campari. The ads played on the sexual entendre of the term "first time."
110. Id. at 48-49. In fine print at the bottom of the page was the statement
"ad parody - not to be taken seriously," and in the table of contents the ad was
as "Fiction,
ad and personal2016
parody."
Publishedlisted
by Digital
Commons@DePaul,
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distress.' Plaintiff argued that the defendant's intention, namely
to harm him, precluded any First Amendment protection regardless
of the statement's veracity because free expression does not permit
one to inflict injury solely for injury's sake."'
The Supreme Court disagreed in a unanimous decision." 3 The
Court applied the New York Times"' "actual malice" standard to
plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
reversed an award for damages."' The New York Times actual
malice standard is a higher standard of fault reserved for public
figure plaintiffs. 1' 6 Originally applied in actions for defamation," 7
it requires that a media defendant act either with knowledge that a
statement is false or with reckless disregard for its truth in order for
a plaintiff to recover." 8 In other words, a statement must be false
and a media defendant must act culpably before the defendant will
incur liability for what it says;" 9 otherwise, the plaintiff has no
cause of action.
The Court placed a premium on the right to speak freely on
matters of public interest, particularly the right to criticize. 2 ' The
Court found Falwell to be a public figure,' and held that criticism,
therefore, even when as sharp as the speech at issue and even when
111. Id.
112. Hustler,485 U.S. at 52-53.
113. Justice White filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Kennedy did not
take part in the decision.
114. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
115. Hustler,485 U.S. at 57.
116. Id. at 56. See also, Jason M. Booth, Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell:
IntentionalInfliction of EmotionalDistress and the FirstAmendment - A RazorSharp Bowling Ball, 18 SW. U. L. REV. 441 (1989).
117. New York Times involved the publication of an allegedly false statement

criticizing an Alabama public official.
118. Boyd C. Famum, Free Speech and Freedom from Speech: Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, the New York Times Actual Malice Standard, and
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 63 IND. L.J. 877, 878 (Fall
1987/1988).

119. Hustler,485 U.S. at 52.
120. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 52 ("Freedoms of expression require 'breathing
space')(citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,

772)(quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272).

121. Id. at 57.
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false, was protected by the First Amendment. 122 Because both
falsehoods and caustic criticism are inevitable in free debate on
public matters, strict liability for either would result in a "chilling
effect" on discourse regarding public figures that has no
constitutional value.2 2 The Court found that the ad parody was
just that - parody, and that the defendant had a protected right to
resort to parody to comment on Falwell.12 Because it was parody
(replete with a disclaimer), Hustler's "ad" was not a false statement
made culpably, and thus was not actionable.2 2 The Court noted
that in public discussion of public figures, "many things done with
motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First
Amendment."' 26 The Court further noted that the "outrageousness"
standard, though supposedly objective, is in actuality too
subjective a check on discussion of political and social matters
because it allows a factfnder to "impose liability on the basis of
[its own] tastes or views," thus conflicting with established policy
of rejecting damage awards for the emotional impact speech may
have on an audience.12 The result of Hustler is clear: public
figures cannot recover damages for emotional distress over true
statements of fact, regardless of the intent of the speaker.'

122. Id. at 51-52 ("[Cjriticism [of public figures], inevitably, will not always
be reasoned or moderate; public figures as well as public officials will
sometimes be subject to 'vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks"') (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 56.
126. Hustler,485 U.S. at 53.
127. Id. at 55.
128. Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An
Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIz. ST. L.J. 423, 438-40 (Summer 1988).
See also, Famam, supra note 118 at 877 (quoting Hustler publisher Larry Flynt

describing his motive behind the ad parody as "to assassinate [Falwell's
character]").
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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C. Plaintiffs'Argumentsin Roach
Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in dismissing their
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because the
plaintiffs' arguments for both mishandling a corpse and intentional
infliction of emotional distress are intertwined, this section will
address only the arguments for mishandling a corpse that overlap
with the arguments for the outrageousness of the defendants'
conduct.
1. Defendants' conduct was outrageousbecause it
involved handling human remains.
Contending that Tay's remains qualified for protection as a
corpse, the plaintiffs argued that until Roach, no New York court
had even suggested that a material distinction existed between
cremated and uncremated remains in determining the
appropriateness of emotional damages.129 Plaintiffs relied on
Sorrentino v. New York130 in asserting that the legal definition of
human remains requires only that some identifiable portion of the
body remain intact.'
Stem's and Hayden's touching Tay's bone
fragments and commenting on them over a national broadcast
made the plaintiffs helpless witnesses to the desecration of their
sister's final resting place, plaintiffs argued, constituting
sufficiently outrageous conduct to state a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because it was objectively patently
outrageous. 132

129. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4-5, Roach v. Stem, 675 N.Y.S.2d 133
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998)(No. 97-01389).
130. Sorrentino v. New York, 212 N.Y.S.2d 160 (N.Y. App. 1961)(3rd
Dept.).
131. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5-6, Roach (No. 97-01389).
132. Id. at 16-7.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7
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2. Plaintiffs satisfiedallfour elements of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
In addition to stating a claim for emotional distress arising from
defendants' handling the plaintiffs' sister's remains, the plaintiffs
further argued that they satisfied all four elements. 3 3 Plaintiffs
argued that (1) Stem's and Hayden's handling of Tay's remains on
national radio and television after plaintiff Roach specifically
warned defendants that such action would cause the family
distress, demonstrated intentional or at least reckless conduct;13 1 (2)
defendants' conduct was outrageous because the handling of
cremated remains on national radio and television was itself
extreme and outrageous behavior;'35 (3) the plaintiffs alleged
severe emotional distress beyond mere embarrassment;'36 and (4)
the plaintiffs' established a causal link between their emotional
distress and the defendants' actions. 3 This, the plaintiffs asserted,
established a viable claim for intentional infliction of emotional
1 3
distress. 1
D. Defendants'Arguments in Roach
Defendants argued that the trial court correctly dismissed
the plaintiffs' action because the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The arguments
addressed in this section pertain only to plaintiffs' claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
1. "Outrageousness"
First, the defendants maintained that their conduct was not
outrageous within the stringent definition of intentional infliction
133. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14-6, Roach (No. 97-01389).
134. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15-6, Roach (No. 97-01389).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 16.
137. Id.
138. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16-7, Roach (No. 97-01389).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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of emotional distress.139 Defendants pointed to the long line of
dismissed claims arising from repugnant and mean-spirited
conduct, 4 ° which they distinguished from the "admittedly offbeat
humor and affection" contained in Stem's tribute to Tay.14 1 As
such, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs' claim was not
actionable.1 42 Defendants further argued that "outrageousness"
must be appraised within the context of the allegedly offensive
conduct.143 Here, Tay rose to fame on Stem's show precisely
because of her eccentricities, and without inflicting emotional
distress upon her family.144 Defendants argued that Tay's history
with Stem, known for his raucousness, apparently did not distress
her family while she was alive and therefore precluded a claim45 for
emotional distress the plaintiffs may allege against defendants.
2. Conduct was within single broadcast,not a campaign of
harassment.
Defendants next maintained that their conduct within the context
of a single broadcast aimed at the general public, rather than a
campaign of harassment targeted solely at the plaintiffs, supported
dismissal on three grounds.4 6 First, the defendants' conduct

139. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 11-2, Roach v. Stem, 675 N.Y.S.2d
133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)(No. 97-01389).
140. Id. at 12, Roach, (No. 97-01389). Stem cited a number of cases from
various jurisdictions, all of which involve conduct, from sexually derisive
statements, See Shea v. Cornell Univ., 596 N.Y.S.2d 503, 504 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993)(3d Dept.), to suits filed for the sole purpose of maligning, harassing, and
intimidating, See Andrews v. Bruk, 631 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995)(2d Dept.), that could be considered reprehensible but were dismissed
nonetheless because the conduct was not sufficiently "outrageous."

141. Id.
142. Id. at 13.
143. Id. For this proposition, Stem relied on Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74
(Okla. 1986). Eddy involved an emotional distress claim from workplace
mistreatment.
144. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 13, Roach (No. 97-01389).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 13, Roach (No. 97-01389).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7
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occurred in the course of its regular business of broadcasting.147
Further, the defendants' regular business of broadcasting
newsworthy items of interest was a legitimate and constitutionally
protected purpose, and the First Amendment precluded liability on
defendants simply because such broadcast might incidentally cause
severe emotional distress to the plaintiffs.' 48 If liability could be
imposed, defendants argued, the media could not exist.'49 Second,
a cause for intentional infliction of emotional distress must arise
from activity directed at the plaintiffs calculated to harm them. 5 °
Plaintiffs here had no cause of action because Stem and Hayden's
conduct was not calculated to harm them.'
Defendants further
argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages because they
were not even present at the time of the defendants' conduct. 2
Third, more than a single broadcast is required to state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress since an action requires
53
repeated broadcasts amounting to a campaign of harassment.1
Here was an isolated incident: 154 a single show broadcast over radio
and later cable television. Defendants argued that the plaintiffs
stated no actionable claim.
3. Severity of emotional distress
Finally, the defendants maintained that the plaintiffs' alleged
55
emotional distress was insufficiently severe to state a claim.
Arguing that although the plaintiffs complained of distress, it was
147. Id. at 14 (quoting Barnum v. Millbrook Care, L.P., 850 F. Supp. 1227,
1238-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aft'd, 43 F.3d 1458 (2nd Cir. 1994).
148. Id. at 14-15.
149. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 13, Roach (No. 97-01389)(quoting
Lamonaco v. CBS, Inc., 22 Med. L. Rptr. 1831, 1832 (3d Cir. 1994)).
150. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 16-7, Roach (No. 97-01389).
151. Id. at 17.
152. Id. at 17-18 (The Restatement's "zone of danger" provision requires
presence at the time of the allegedly outrageous conduct in order for liability to
ensue).
153. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 18, Roach (No. 97-01389).
154. Id. at 19.
Id.Commons@DePaul,
at 19-20.
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hardly so severe that "no reasonable person could be expected to
endure it."' 6 Defendants maintained that the plaintiffs' claim
therefore fell short of adequate.'57
E. Court'sAnalysis

The appellate court, in a relatively brief opinion, upheld part of
the lower court dismissal, but reversed and remanded the case for
trial before a jury on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.'58 One justice dissented, holding that he would have
affirmed the prior order in whole and dismissed the claim in its
entirety.'59
1. Mishandlingof a Corpse
The court wasted no time in, nor did it devote much space to,
agreeing with the trial court that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
for interference with the disposition and mishandling of a corpse. 6
The court stated that "[iln general, such a cause of action requires
a showing of interference with the right of the next-of-kin to
dispose of the body.' 6' The court concluded that the defendants
did not interfere with the plaintiff's decision to cremate Tay's body
and give part of the remains to Hayden, and therefore the plaintiffs
stated no claim. 6 The court drew the line of disposition at the
family's decision to apportion the remains and give them to others.
156. Id. at 19. Stem argued that plaintiffs' allegations of inability to enjoy
the company of friends and fear of speaking with old friends and neighbors
paled in comparison to a dismissed claim involving recurring nightmares and
sleeplessness, See Khan v. American Airlines, 639 N.E.2d 210 (Ill. App. 1994).
Stem further maintained that plaintiffs' alleged suffering here was not "truly
devastating," as required by Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d
1101 (Md. App. 1986).
157. Id. at 20.
158. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 133-6.
159. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 136-7 (Krausman, J., dissenting).
160. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Thus, the court impliedly held that the defendants did not disturb
Tay's grave or desecrate her remains.
2. IntentionalInfliction of EmotionalDistress
The court differed, however, in its treatment of the plaintiffs'
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.'63 The court
acknowledged the requisite "outrageousness" in the defendants'
conduct in order to impose liability on them. Quoting Murphy v.
American Home Products,' the court recognized that the
defendants' conduct must have been "so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community.' ', 6' The court further recognized that the
element of "outrageous conduct" is purposely "rigorous and
difficult to satisfy"' in order to eliminate trivial complaints and
ensure the authenticity of emotional distress claims.'66
Nonetheless, the court concluded that, despite the fact that the
defendants did not interfere with the plaintiffs' disposition of Tay's
body, the element of outrageousness was not necessarily lacking as
a matter of law. 67 Discounting the defendants' contention that
their conduct was not shocking, the court held that a jury might
reasonably conclude that "the manner in which Tay's remains were
handled, for entertainment purposes and against the express wishes
of her family, went beyond the bounds of decent behavior.', 68 The
appellate court thus reversed the lower court's order, reinstated the
complaint, and remanded the case for trial on the issue of whether
Stem and Hayden's conduct amounted to intentional infliction of
169
emotional distress.

163.
164.
165.
166.

Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 133-6.
58 N.Y.2d. 293 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1983).
Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
Id. at 135 (quoting Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc, 81 N.Y.2d 115

(1993)).
167. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
168. Id.
169. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
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3. The Dissent
Justice Krausman, the sole dissenter, disagreed with the
majority opinion, stating that he concurred with the prior order in
toto. 7 ' Justice Krausman conceded that defendants Stem and
Hayden's conduct might have been inappropriate, tasteless, and
insensitive in the eyes of some members of society.'
However,
he disagreed that the defendants' conduct gave rise to a right for
plaintiffs to recover emotional distress damages.'
Citing the
common law notion that emotional distress claims are easily
feigned, he stressed the requirement of "extreme and outrageous
conduct" in modem tort actions.' 73 Quoting Howell, he noted that
every one of the emotional distress claims that the court considered
had failed "because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently
outrageous.""
Justice Krausman proposed a more flexible balancing test to
consider all the facts at issue, contending that "[t]he issue of
whether decedent's brother and sister may recover tort damages
cannot be considered in a vacuum, with total disregard for who
Debbie Tay was."' 75 He implied that the validity of the plaintiffs'
claim was buttressed by their sister's personality, her benefit from
associating with Stem, and her inferred reaction to the use of her
remains.' 76 He also considered the fact that Driscol voluntarily
gave her sister's remains to Hayden, who then brought them onto
the show for a tribute to Tay, to be critical in tipping the balance in
the defendants' favor.' 77
170. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (Krausman, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (Krausman, J., dissenting). Justice
Krausman did not mention the finding in Esposito-Hilder,possibly because the
decision was from another department.
175. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (Krausman, J., dissenting).
176. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (citing that Tay had appeared on Stem's
show with her mother, and even launched her own career from her appearances
on Stem's show).
177. Id. at 137.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7
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As for the memorial broadcast itself, Justice Krausman found its
context significant. Hayden claimed to have brought Tay's
remains on air because "the only happiness Debbie had was the
Howard Stem Show," and opened them up because, having
enjoyed and participated in Stem's crude humor during her
lifetime, believed Tay "would love this." 78 Justice Krausman also
pointed to the fact that Stem recommended Hayden have Tay's
remains buried, and that the show's closing credits dedicated the
show "in loving memory of Debbie Tay."' 79 Although the show's
producer ignored Roach's request to stop discussing Tay's
remains, Justice Krausman found nothing to implicate Stem,
Hayden, or Infinity as acting to cause the plaintiffs harm. 8 '
IV.

IMPACT

A. Roach Makes EmotionalDistress Claims Easierto Proceed
Because It Lessens the Necessary Level of "Outrageousness."
The Roach decision effectively lowers the bar for emotional
distress claims, at least in New York. Although the court in Roach
did not determine that Stem and Hayden's conduct was outrageous
as a matter of law, it left the question to a jury to decide. Courts
are entitled to defer to a jury in cases where "reasonable men may
differ" as to whether conduct is outrageous.' 8 ' However, when
expression is concerned, as in Roach, passing the question of
"outrageousness" to the discretion of a jury is a dubious move.
The Supreme Court in Hustler recognized the "inherent
subjectiveness" of the "outrageous" standard, and specifically
cautioned against its application to political and social discourse
because of the threat it poses to free expression.'82 The Court
opposed jury determination of "outrageousness" in cases involving
expression because of the potential inability of individual jurors to
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Roach, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
181. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
Hustler,
485 U.S. at 55.2016
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objectively weigh First Amendment concerns, and instead impose
'18
liability "on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression."
The Court required a rigid standard of "outrageousness" to impute
liability for expression in order to provide ample "breathing room"
for expression.'
The court in Roach does just what Hustler
admonishes. By letting the question reach a jury, the court in
Roach allows individual notions of taste to infect emotional
distress torts, thereby watering down the legal definition of
"outrageous." As a result, Roach controverts both the common
law and modem law embodied in the Restatement because it
considerably lessens the rigidity of the "outrageousness" standard
to the detriment of free expression.
The Roach decision is troubling because the court did not
explain how the defendants' conduct was extreme, especially after
it declined to hold that cremated remains possess the same status as
a corpse and thereby implied that cremated remains are mere
objects once the decedent's family has dispensed with them.
Touching and discussing objects, even cremated human remains, is
not extremely shocking. Hayden legally obtained the remains, and
he legally brought them onto the show. Stem, Hayden, and others
discussed Tay and commented on the remains. The fact that those
discussing Tay and her remains all knew her personally is even less
shocking; surely, we are free to discuss the people and events that
enter, and in this case exit, our life.
Unlike in Esposito-Hilder,Stem did not use his show to target
Tay or her family; in fact, neither of Tay's siblings was even
mentioned by name.'85 Every comment was either a true statement
183. Id.
184. Id. at 52 (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1986))(quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272).
185. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 9, Roach v. Stem, 675 N.Y.2d App.
Div. 1998)(No. 97-01389). A review of the transcript of the broadcast
contained in the record shows that Driscol was mentioned or referred to
approximately ten times as "Debbie's sister," "the sister," and "she." Roach was
referred to one time as "her [Tay's] brother." Tay had another sister who
likewise was mentioned in the same anonymous manner. See Record on Appeal
at 34-67, Roach v. Stem, 675 N.Y.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)(No. 9701389).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7
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or an opinion; although some of the comments may have been
calculated to be humorous, none can fairly be classified as
calculated to harm. At worst, the defendants' comments were
juvenile.
Additionally, Tay's remains were not mutilated. Only Stem
touched Tay's remains, and he did so momentarily before placing
them back in their container and returning them to Hayden. Had
Stem thrown Tay's ashes onto the floor or extinguished cigarettes
on them, or had Hayden stolen Tay's remains, perhaps the
plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress might make sense. The
events that occurred, however, simply do not surpass all decency of
civilized community. Though unconventional, the memorial
clearly exhibited affection for Tay. 8 6 Further, the record suggests
that plaintiff Roach was estranged from his sister; 87 if true, it
seems patently absurd, not to mention outrageous itself, to award
Roach damages for emotional distress because of a discussion
about his estranged sister. By holding that the expression in the
broadcast here might surpass all bounds of decency, the court
opens the door to a number of potential trivial claims for emotional
distress arising out of handling other objects that arguably occupy
the same status as cremated remains, such as religious or
sentimental objects such as heirlooms or mementos. Thus, Roach
defeats the purposes of the "outrageousness" standard, which is to
limit actionable emotional distress claims to cases that are extreme
and to avoid trivial claims. Emotional distress claims should not
proceed simply because of the emotional impact that the
expression may have on an audience. 88

186. Indeed, Stem's suggestion that Hayden have Tay's ashes pulverized and
buried, Ralph's debate with Hayden over preventing Tay's overdose, the
footage of Tay on the cable television broadcast, and the dedication of the show
"in loving memory of Debbie Tay" negate any contention that the broadcast was
done with culpability.
187. Record on Appeal at 65, Roach, (No. 97-01389)(During the course of
the broadcast, Hayden told Stem that Tay had two sisters and a brother, adding
"...I think her brother, she's estranged from.").
188. Hustler,485 U.S. at 55.
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B. Roach Circumvents FirstAmendment Analysis and
Infringes On ProtectedExpression.
The court in Roach should not have concluded that Stem and
Hayden's expression might rise to a level of "outrageousness"
without considering actual malice. Hustler requires a level of
culpability before a media defendant can be held liable for
emotional distress arising from its expression concerning public
figures.8 9 The court in Roach, however, overlooked this crucial
factor. Clearly, Tay was a public figure: through her repeated
appearances on Stem's show and her own cable access program,
she placed herself in the public eye. Although Tay's siblings were
not public figures, the expression at issue focused not on them but
on Tay. The actual malice standard therefore should have been
applied in Roach. Because no false statements about either Tay or
her family were made, and because no one on the show acted
culpably, Roach presents absence of actual malice and therefore
the expression within the broadcast was protected.
Further, the court should have examined the newsworthiness of
Tay's death in assessing the broadcast. Had the court considered
newsworthiness, it would have found two bases upon which Tay's
death was newsworthy. First, Tay was a public figure; the death of
a public figure, however minor, surely gainers public interest and
thus is newsworthy. Second, Tay's death resulted from a drug
overdose. Drug abuse is a topic just as newsworthy as teen
pregnancy, alcohol abuse, and mental health recovery. The debate
over the prevention of Tay's death is exactly the kind of discussion
on public issues that the First Amendment protects. A public
figure's drug overdose is as newsworthy as an unknown person's
car accident or pierced breast. Indeed, New York itself has held
items of lesser importance as newsworthy. 9 The threshold for
newsworthiness is not high; clearly it was met in Roach.
189. Hustler,485 U.S. at 55.
190. See, e.g., Bruce P. Keller and Craig Bloom, The Right of Publicity
Versus the First Amendment, 17 SUM COMM. LAw. 3 (Summer 1999)(citing
Stephano v. News Group Publishing, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174 (N.Y. App.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/7

28

Sabetto: Sticks and Stones and Chips of Bones: Shock Humor and Emotional D

2000]

SHOCK HUMOR

389

V. CONCLUSION

Perhaps Roach is a fluke decision. As Messenger demonstrates,
New York courts are still willing to balance First Amendment
protection of expression against individual protection from harm
arising out of expression. As the Restatement suggests and case
law establishes, a media defendant cannot be liable for emotional
distress claims when it has not acted culpably. Stem and Hayden
did not act culpably, and thus liability for plaintiffs' emotional
distress should not even be at issue. Roach is not a question of
whether the media can say anything it wants: Roach is not about
desecrating the dead or damaging others with expression. The real
issue in Roach is taste, and taste is too subjective a matter for a
court or a jury to judge. If the defendants are guilty of anything, it
is poor taste. Poor taste is not sufficiently extreme to support a
claim of emotional distress. Holding otherwise is unfair.
We live in a democratic society. Clearly, one of our most
cherished values is freedom of expression. We recognize that the
marketplace of ideas, self-government, and the search for truth all
require the free flow of expression. Ideas clash, and necessarily
there will be friction from differences of opinion; this is the price
for our freedom. Although it cannot run unchecked, the media is
the best way to promote ideas by providing a vehicle for their
expression. The approach in Hustler appropriately balances free
expression and redress for injury. Roach chips away at our valued
First Amendment rights, and the court should have taken more into
consideration than it did.
Robert Sabetto

1984)(holding that developments in the fashion world are of consumer interest
and are therefore newsworthy topics deserving of First Amendment protection)),
Messenger v. Gruner, 2000 N.Y. Lexis 75 (Feb. 17, 2000)(holding that teen sex,
teen pregnancy, and alcohol abuse are newsworthy topics deserving of First
protection).
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